There Goes The Fear

Reputations sometimes grow about players...they don’t track back/they never give the ball away/they go down easily/they are a brilliant every game and usually Man-of-the Match. (For the last one I refer you to either Bryan Robson or Steven Gerrard as viewed by a string of co-commentators). Sometimes the reputations are positive, sometimes negative. And in most cases they are usually exaggerations, or simply myths.

Gerrard and Robson have had quiet games. Paul Scholes did occasionally misplace a pass. Re-watch the 1981 Cup Final Replay and see how much hard toil Glenn Hoddle did actually put in, largely ignored by his critics. And there was even apparently a game during his spell in Holland when Luis Suarez did not roll-over six times when there was a passing breeze, although admittedly that rumour is unsubstantiated.

The same is true of Managers. Anyone who has played close attention to his time at Spurs knows that the Harry Redknapp is not the perfect man-manager casual readers of the back pages might believe. However, on the flip side of that, he is also is more open minded to tactical changes than the picture his harshest critics paint.

At Portsmouth he went with his gut instinct, and against some of his more cautious players’ wishes, to change to a system he felt was more suitable to the players he had. From the outside, he looked right. He had three centre-backs reasonably comfortable on the ball, wide players who may be more effective in advanced position than at full-back, and a player who could do with a bit of freedom of the middle of the park (Niko Kranjcar, incidentally). So, he changed the system to 3-4-1-2, against popular convention, and after a week practising it in training.

He has been more reluctant to change systems at Tottenham, but he has occasionally done so. Towards the end of his first season, in similar circumstances to Portsmouth, he played three centre-backs away at Everton; he utilised two attacking full-backs (Alan Hutton and Gareth Bale) as wing backs, with three centre-backs comfortable on the ball (Corluka, King and Woodgate), a central midfield three which gave more license for the talented Modric to roam (alongside Jenas and Huddlestone), behind a front two (Keane and Defoe).

The three in central midfield is key, because it is very unusual for any side of the highest calibre to play without three in the middle now, either through a player being able to play between the lines by dropping off from the hole in a 4-4-1-1, or by playing a 4-2-3-1. 

Rarer is the 4-3-3, but seemingly forgotten by most, Redknapp used this positively, and promisingly, with Spurs a couple of times last season.

In the second league game of last season we had an excellent win at Stoke with Lennon and Bale playing either side of Crouch in front of a midfield three of Palacios, Huddlestone and Jenas. Also away, in the second half of the league game at Wolves, Lennon and Bale came on, this time to play in a front three with Defoe in the middle, and looked like creating a goal-scoring opportunity every time they got the ball. Lennon played on the left, and Bale on the right, and while they hugged the touchline when they received the ball, the three midfielders allowed them to be more advanced and yet still have space to run onto, inside, on their favoured foot.

This is exactly how Angel Di Maria and Cristiano Ronaldo play at Real Madrid, how Messi and Ronaldinhio both started at Barcelona, and how great wide players from Chris Waddle to Johan Cryuff have prospered. Football at the highest level is all about Movement.

Great forward players also need to be able to rotate within those forward positions. At International Level for Wales Bale has no problem playing on the right because he has three central midfielders behind him, and plenty of space to come infield. And as early as 2006, Martin Jol wrote in The Times during the World Cup to say that Aaron Lennon could play in the hole, and he thought he could do that for England. He rarely played Lennon in the hole himself, with Robbie Keane and Dimitar Berbatov at his disposal the following season, but when he did (at the front of a diamond in the 3-3 draw at Stamford Bridge in the FA Cup), he was fantastic.

As well as Bale and Lennon, Spurs have Rafa Van Der Vaart; so three match-winners who can play between the lines and win games. Not all are going to be fit or on form all the time, so the challenge is to use them, and the rest of the squad, to the greatest effect.

Yesterday at Newcastle, Spurs started well for the first quarter of an hour but started getting sloppy in possession and the game got scrappy. Newcastle never really threatened, but Spurs failed to capitalise on being, on paper anyway, the superior team player-for-player.

To begin with, Modric tucked into midfield from the left, Bale was advanced on the right, Van Der Vaart was playing behind Adebayor, with Ekotto effectively starting as a wing-back, clearly under tactical instruction. The shape looked promising. The movement in the final third created an early opportunity for Van Der Vaart after a lovely dummy by Adebayor, and twice nearly created further chances, with final flicks just failing to put Van Der Vaart in.

But, Spurs still lacked a cutting-edge. Bale looked ineffective from the right, but was even less effective when he moved to the left midway through the first-half. There is a reluctance from many fans for Bale to play on the right, perhaps naturally, because when you look back at many of his great moments they have been on the left. Both his outstanding performances against Inter were on the left, as was his wonderful performance at home against Chelsea in April 2010, and countless other games. But in many of those games, including the three I mentioned, he was running from deep and running into space, against teams who were pushing up on the attack.

He gets less space to do the most damage when pushed high-up up on the left of a 4-4-2 against a team that is defending deep and in numbers, which is why Redknapp has often said he could be most dangerous at a left back, where he first showed how good he was when Redknapp finally gave him a run. His left-foot and technical ability is so good however, he is still the best option on the left of a 4-4-2 not just at the club, but arguably in the world. But, then, who plays 4-4-2 now?

Bale has also excelled when given more freedom, such as away at Arsenal last season, at home against the same opposition in April 2010, as well as his successes playing on the right already mentioned. His poor performance yesterday, which including giving the ball away cheaply when doing pieces of skill he usually nails against the best opposition in the world, was due to form rather more than positioning.

With over half-an-hour remaining and the score at 1-1 the introduction of Jermain Defoe, who was fresh from two weeks without a game, looked to be what was needed. And indeed, Defoe came on and made a difference, scoring the second goal and twice being in positions that could have won Tottenham the match (the first time he didn’t receive the ball from Adebayor, and the second time he failed to square the ball to Jake Livermore who had an empty net).

However, Redknapp could have been braver with his substitution. He could have brought Defoe on, but rather than taking off Van Der Vaart, he could have brought off Bale, and played either a diamond, a 4-3-1-2 with Van Der Vaart in a free role behind the strikers or even the Christmas Tree. 

Redknapp said he took Van Der Vaart off because he had played two International games; that’s true, but so had Bale, and Van Der Vaart utilises his energy in dangerous positions (as Joe Cole noted at the weekend conserving energy is favoured more outside the Premier League), as opposed to the all action Bale, who clearly looked tired.

There are times when there are more reasons for Van Der Vaart to come off, such as when he is on a booking, but having spoken to the press about a historic hamstring injury in the week (leading to speculative team news Van Der Vaart was doubtful, when he wasn't), it seemed Redknapp was expediently jumping into the bed he had already made. Did Van Der Vaart really look “leggy”? Or more tired than Bale? Or was it a kop out to not change the shape?

A Christmas Tree, a 4-3-2-1 with Van Der Vaart and Defoe advanced of a three-man midfield, could have been the best system with the players, had Redknapp been brave enough to take Bale off. It would have allowed Modric to have freedom in the middle, the attacking full-backs space to push into on both sides with Livermore and Parker protecting the centre-backs, while also giving Van Der Vaart more license to roam as well.

Instead, Bale struggled on the left, and we were without our most regular match-winner for the final third of the game. There are times when it is ideal two have two recognised strikers on the pitch, but it would be foolish to think that 4-4-2 is the only way to do that, particularly with the players we have got.

Just a look at the current league table is a reminder that when Man City or Man Utd play two strikers, one of them drops in the hole, or when they play with a front three, two of them come in from advanced positions out-wide. Just as Chelsea also do, with three central midfielders behind them. Just as Barcelona do. And Real Madrid. And on the International stage Spain, Holland and Germany.  

At the highest level shape and movement are key. Redknapp knows that, and he knows he has the players. He just needs to be brave enough to put that into practice. To Dare is to Do.

MG

My e-book on Tottenham Hotspur's return to the European Cup for the first time in 49 seasons is now available to download on Amazon and Smashwords.